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We examine whether the conditions affecting initial expressions of hostility are similar to those
affecting militarized disputes. Analyzing dyadic interactions during the years 1951–1992, we esti-
mate a model to take into account selection effects and check it against another allowing conjunc-
tive causation. Both provide close approximations to theoretical models of the conflict process and
yield similar results. We confirm Kant’s belief that all states are subject to the realist conditions of
interstate competition that makes disputes likely, but that liberal influences, if present, can con-
strain the escalation of such disputes to war. Several influences on the conflict process have non-
monotonic effects over the range of state behavior. Geopolitical factors affect the opportunity for
conflict more at lower levels of the conflict process, when less information is available regarding
acceptable settlements and actors’ resolve, than at higher levels. Factors affecting willingness gain
importance as the conflict process unfolds because they facilitate the flow of information relevant
to the ongoing dispute. The proposition that democracy and interdependence encourage diplomatic
conflicts as signals of resolve is not supported.
Although militarized conflict between states is rare, diplomatic and other
forms of low-level interstate conflict are not rare, and they have the potential to
escalate to more violent forms of dispute. Consequently, scholars and policy
makers have a great interest in the tools of conflict management and early
warning. It may be that the knowledge we have accumulated about the effects
of liberal political and economic processes, as well as geopolitical factors, on
war and other forms of militarized dispute also holds at the less violent end of
the conflict spectrum. But maybe not. This is important to know, for although
efforts to manage and resolve conflict should be undertaken at all stages of the
conflict process, it is probably the case that the chances of success are im-
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proved when efforts are initiated earlier rather than later. If so, we should focus
on factors that are likely to have maximal impact at that particular phase of an
evolving dispute.
Formal theories of interstate conflict—crises, militarized disputes, all-out war—
conceptualize such events in terms of moves and countermoves and thus at-
tempt to model stages of the conflict process. Bringing our empirical models
closer into line with these formal models for purposes of testing hypotheses
stands as a significant challenge for future conflict research, in terms of both
data collection and analysis. We take one step in this direction by considering
the range of conflictual interstate behavior and examine whether in the context
of a single empirical model, the conditions affecting initial expressions of hos-
tility are similar to those affecting militarized disputes (MIDs), which are not
only more serious but also represent subsequent stages in the conflict process.
Most research undertaken to explain the occurrence of international conflict
has employed additive models to assess the impact of various factors, and it
usually has assumed that the relationships between conflictual behavior and its
correlates are monotonic. Often, however, alternative statistical models can pro-
vide a closer approximation to theory.
The literature suggests a readily identifiable set of inf luences on inter-
national conflict, influences that might be exercised at multiple points in the
conflict process. There is reason to expect a particular pattern in the relative
weightiness of these influences, with some factors being more important in
earlier stages of an unfolding process and others more important at later stages.
We go on to show that our conceptualization of these different types of influ-
ences is borne out by the empirical evidence. Our analysis takes up a variety of
related issues: the role of low-level conflict and signaling in rational models of
bargaining, especially as they relate to the liberal peace hypothesis; problems
of selection bias; the theoretical and methodological implications of differenti-
ating politically relevant dyads from others; and contingent causation and the
distinction between the opportunity and the willingness to initiate disputes.
Signaling and Selection
In the past decade, the systematic analysis of international conflict has fo-
cused on characteristics of the relations between pairs of nation-states (dyads).
The theoretical literature increasingly has incorporated the notion that conflict
unfolds in stages. This is a natural outgrowth of using sequential strategic choice
models to formalize the logic of crisis interaction and to frame quantitative
empirical testing. A key premise is that fully informed states can generally
resolve their disputes before resorting to force (Fearon 1995). If a settlement
acceptable to both sides is knowable, rational leaders will prefer to reach these
settlements through nonviolent forms of interaction rather than pay the costs of
war to arrive at the same outcome. War and other costly contests can be ex-
plained by states’ lack of information. Each side’s degree of commitment or
1046 David Kinsella and Bruce Russett
resolve in achieving an acceptable outcome matters for arriving at a negotiated
settlement prior to war, but it is private information. States can convey this
information through their actions, but they often have incentives to misrepre-
sent their resolve so as to achieve more favorable settlements.
Information asymmetries can be overcome only if actions intended to convey
private information are credible. Costly actions send credible signals because
only states that are committed to a particular outcome are willing to communi-
cate their resolve in a way that imposes extra costs on them, either now or in
the future. This insight further clarifies some causal mechanisms behind the
“democratic peace.” Diplomatic protests and sanctions, even those falling short
of an explicit or discernible threat to use force, may send signals that a state
will at some point be prepared to use military force to protect its interests.
Such signals may be more believable when sent by democratic states because
elected governments pay steeper domestic “audience costs” when their bluffs
are called by foreign opponents (Fearon 1994a, Smith 1998a). But the signals
might be less credible if directed against other democracies since the domestic
audience may perceive the use of force against another democracy as a sign of
an incompetent foreign policy (Mintz and Geva 1993). Democracies thus make
fewer idle threats, so the conflictual diplomatic behavior they do engage in
contains credible information about their resolve. A domestic political opposi-
tion can enhance the credibility of such signals when opposition parties echo
the foreign policy commitments of the party in power. Even a silent (but not
suppressed) domestic opposition is conducive to effective signaling since dem-
ocratic governance is transparent and potential foreign opponents assume that
any disunity of purpose will be reflected in a democracy’s domestic political
discourse (Schultz 1998, 1999).
The ability of democratic states to signal resolve should reduce the likeli-
hood that they will become involved in militarized disputes, especially with
other democracies.1 Their actions tend to reveal private information upon which
peaceful bargains can be struck. Yet the implications for their involvement in
less severe forms of conflict are less clear. A signaling logic suggests that au-
dience costs should dissuade democratic states from engaging in behavior that
misrepresents privately held information and also that the transparency of dem-
ocratic institutions should allow foreign opponents to perceive their resolve
correctly (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Starr 1992), but it says little
about how often democracies or other regime types engage in signaling behav-
ior. One reasonable extension of the argument is that because democracies are
likely to experience fewer challenges to their signals of resolve, they have less
need to reiterate their resolve by sending additional costly signals. Other things
1 Schultz’s argument about the transparency of democratic institutions and the increased likeli-
hood of peaceful outcomes is a monadic claim, but he does say that “we can surmise that . . . the
probability of war [in a democratic dyad] would be lower than in an interaction involving one
democracy or none” (Schultz 1998, 840; also see Schultz 2002).
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being equal, that implies a lower likelihood of involvement in all forms of
conflictual behavior, for which there is some empirical evidence (e.g., Leeds
and Davis 1999).
There are other views, however. Democratic states treat the inherent credibil-
ity of their signals as an asset to be exploited in their international dealings. If
experience has shown their leaders that diplomatic and other nonmilitary chal-
lenges bring payoffs without a high risk of escalation to violence, they may
actually have more incentive than other regime types to act at the lower end of
the conflict spectrum (Morrow 2000). Because democratic dyads often are eco-
nomically interdependent, their more numerous commercial linkages may also
provide more opportunities to signal resolve below the threshold of the threat
or use of force. Compared to other dyads, then, democratic and interdependent
dyads may well experience more lower level diplomatic and economic disputes
(Gartzke and Jo 2001; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001).2 This leads to two
empirical questions: what is the net effect of these divergent tendencies, and
are they manifest to varying degrees at different points along the conflict con-
tinuum (which often correspond to different stages in a sequential conflict
process)?
Since many of the insights on signaling come from the literature on crisis
interaction (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997; Morrow 1989),
it may not be surprising that expectations are clearer at the more violent end of
the spectrum. Thus, when at least one state in an interacting dyad is demo-
cratic, the credibility of signals should help to diffuse the conflict process be-
fore it reaches the level of use of force and, very possibly, before the display or
even the threat of force.3 The latter is the threshold for a MID, so the signaling
logic comports well with the robust empirical finding that jointly democratic
dyads experience fewer MID initiations and the common if less robust finding
that democratic states experience fewer violent disputes with nondemocratic
states (Rummel 1995; Russett and Oneal 2001, chap. 3). It is at lower levels of
conflict that predictions become competing or murky due to the countervailing
tendencies just discussed and the fact that little in the signaling literature pro-
vides more specific hypotheses about diplomatic, economic, and other forms
of nonmilitarized conflict behavior.
If low-level signalling of resolve or interest affects the likelihood of escala-
tion, one must consider how selection effects potentially undermine inferences
about war and peace (Smith 1998b; see also King 1989, chap. 9). If the func-
tioning of democratic institutions increases the probability that democratic dy-
2 Gartzke and Jo (2001) actually distinguish two variants of the signaling argument. “Cheap
talk” signaling—which should really be labeled “credible talk” signaling—refers to the ability of
democracies to communicate resolve using very low-level (i.e., verbal) conflictual behavior. There-
fore, they predict that although democracies will engage more frequently in very low-level con-
flict, they will become involved in fewer conflicts involving more than verbal exchanges.
3 Eyerman and Hart (1996), using the SHERFACS scale that begins with a dispute phase preced-
ing the conflict phase (a threat to use force, but not yet actual use), appear to support this.
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ads will be selected out of the sample of dyads at risk of military conflict, then
those that remain are not representative of the population of democratic dyads,
making it difficult to arrive at accurate estimates of the net impact of democ-
racy at that level of conflict. The same may hold for economically interdepen-
dent dyads.
The potential for selection bias is not limited to large-N analyses of inter-
state conflict. Some case-study work focuses on low-level militarized disputes,
treating the very emergence of such a dispute between democracies as an ex-
ception to the democratic peace and then focusing on whether and why further
escalation to all-out war may not occur (e.g., Layne 1995; Rock 1997). But if
one regards low-level militarized disputes as possible though rare phenomena
between democracies, then two questions are relevant. One is why the milita-
rized disputes that do arise do not escalate to war. The other is why so few of
the many diplomatic disputes between democracies ever escalate to any form
of militarized dispute in the first place (Russett 1995). Studying “near misses”
in detail merely focuses attention on an unrepresentative sample of democratic
dyads—outliers where factors outside the theory exert weightier impact. Al-
though some argue that such studies are useful for theory building, if the inten-
tion is to elucidate causal mechanisms consistent with the theory under
examination, they are more likely to muddle than to sharpen our understanding
(Morrow 2000). By shifting attention to lower levels of conflict, we can begin
to take into account the “dogs that didn’t bark,” at least some of them.
Opportunity, Willingness, and Information
Although it seems logically sound, we are unpersuaded by the claim that
democracies might more often engage in nonmilitarized conflictual behavior
because the risk of escalation to violence is lower than for nondemocracies.
Like many other efforts to provide the microfoundations of patterned state be-
havior, this is often a monadic line of argument, but it stands to reason that
true, democratic dyads should experience quite a bit more low-level conflict
since a similar calculus is operating simultaneously on both states. Yet liberal
theory, while certainly not positing complete harmony of interests between dem-
ocratic states, does suggest that the operation of liberal norms and institutions
should make unnecessary this kind of posturing as a means to convey private
information. Costly signals are not needed when two states are linked by shared
norms and practices of conflict resolution: there are many ways to convey pri-
vate information short of threatening to use force.
Nonetheless, we do need to take seriously the possibility that the effects of
democracy and interdependence, as well as other factors, are not monotonic
along the range of international conflict. What patterns do we expect? By def-
inition, at early stages of the conflict process states have engaged in minimal
interaction over a particular issue in dispute (Bremer 1993). Since state behav-
ior conveys information (whether accurate or not), there is less of it available
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as the process is beginning to unfold, so states must rely more on contextual
factors like geographic proximity and state capabilities when making decisions.
Continuing interaction over a contentious issue is like an evolving bargaining
process in which more information becomes available to the participants. As
more information is exchanged through signaling, the impact of contextual fac-
tors on state behavior is likely to recede. Then, influences identified with lib-
eral theory—democratic governance, economic interdependence, and membership
in international organizations, all of which are indicative of dyadic interactions
that communicate private information—should become relatively more impor-
tant than they were at earlier stages.
The possibility of interaction varies greatly across dyads. Relations within
many dyads are extremely “thin,” with little trade, interactions in only a few
international organizations, and little ability or incentive to engage in violent
conflict. Such dyads, rather than simply labeled peaceful, are better character-
ized as pairs of states that are nearly irrelevant to each other. “Peace” between
them thus is more nearly explained by their lack of interaction than by the
kinds of positive interactions deriving from trade, similar political systems, al-
liances, or other influences commonly identified as contributors to peace. Con-
sequently, many analysts (Bremer 1992a, 1992b, 1993; Maoz 1998; Maoz and
Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001) focus on politically relevant dyads (PRDs),
defined as pairs of states that are contiguous by land or narrow bodies of water
or contain a major power with geographically expansive interests and able to
exert power over a large segment of the globe. This theoretically derived limi-
tation incorporates the widely confirmed finding that geographical proximity
and contiguity together form the single best predictor of international violence
and that great powers engage in far more violent conflict than do weaker states.
It thus concentrates attention on the 20% or so of all dyads that account for
nearly 90% of all MIDs and avoids trying to explain the absence of conflict
between all the pairs of states that have neither the capability nor incentive to
fight each other.4
Analyses limited to the politically relevant dyads often reach similar conclu-
sions as those addressed to all dyads in the international system, and, not sur-
prisingly, the relationships are typically much stronger in the former set (Lemke
and Reed 2001a). But they are not always the same. For example, some analy-
ses have found common membership in international organizations to have a
modest but significant effect in reducing conflict among the PRDs, but not
among all dyads (Oneal and Russett 1999a). High levels of dyadic trade show a
strong and significant conflict-reducing effect among PRDs, even in all-dyad
analyses (Bennett and Stam 2000; Oneal and Russett 1999b), but among non-
PRDs alone trade may be positively related to conflict if there is no adequate
4 In the context of the early 1990s, when dyadic analysis came to the fore, limiting the analysis
also reduced computational demands on the technology then available. This benefit, however, quickly
became irrelevant as the hardware and software developed.
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control for distance. The latter of course does not mean that the absence of
trade causes peace. It means that the cost and time of shipping goods great
distances discourage trade just as they decrease the incentive and capability to
ship fighting forces. Trade and conflict are correlated because both drop with
distance, not because trade causes conflict.
Consequently, variables affecting the frequency of conflict may not produce
coefficient estimates of similar size for PRDs as for “nonrelevant” dyads, or
even estimates with the same sign. Despite the advantages of concentrating
most analysis on the PRDs, something is lost by doing so. After all, there are
some militarized disputes between non-PRDs, and we need to explain them,
too. For example, Iraq and Israel have fought though neither is a major power
and they do not share a border. Early work by geographers O’Loughlin (1986)
and Anselin (1988) noted the “regional” effects of second- and third-order prox-
imity, and theoretically informed efforts by Lemke (1995) and Maoz (1996)
help to expand the definition of politically relevant dyads, but some MIDs and
even a few wars involving non-PRDs remain beyond their scope.
How might we reconceptualize political relevance and the risk of conflict
without relying on assumptions about proximity or global reach, however well
informed? One productive approach is in the concepts of opportunity and will-
ingness to come into conflict (Most and Starr 1989). Siverson and Starr (1991,
24) develop the term opportunity “to mean the possibilities that are available to
any entity within the environment.” Here they put equal power ratio along with
proximity, contiguity, and major power status. Their concept of willingness would
include the Kantian suppressors of conflict: democracy, interdependence, open
economies, and international organizations. It also includes the decision to con-
clude an alliance, which “reflects a willingness to accept the potential costs of
alliance as balanced against potential gains.” Like form of government, low
trade barriers, and decisions to join intergovernmental organizations (IGOs),
alliances result from “conscious choices of decision makers that indicate posi-
tions of policy preference” (Siverson and Starr 1991, 26). Similarly, in Bueno
de Mesquita’s (1981) expected-utility model, power discounted by distance in-
dicates the expectation of victory and, hence, opportunity, and alliances—and,
by reasonable extension from his specification, political system, trade, and IGO
memberships—indicate the utility of winning and thus the willingness to fight.5
The categories of opportunity and willingness also imply something about
the relative importance of various influences on the conflict process, in terms
of their potential to convey information that exists or is most relevant at partic-
ular stages of the process. Many of the factors we associate with opportunity in
the analysis of interstate conflict, especially the geopolitical variables high-
lighted in realist theory, are either unchanging or change rather slowly. Conse-
quently, as indicators of interests and capabilities, they represent information
5 Bueno de Mesquita also includes a state’s allies, and the probability they will assist it, in his
power calculations. We briefly discuss the matter of joiners below.
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that tends to be better known to interacting states—information that is not only
available, but also reasonably unbiased—and thus more likely to be drawn upon
at earlier stages of a conflictual interaction when other information (like com-
mitment and resolve) is not well known.
The factors we associate with willingness are, by definition, closer to actual
interactions in a given instance. Liberal theory highlights the conflict-suppressing
effects of democracy, trade, and other forms of societal openness and integra-
tion, which provide not only a basis for shared interests and norms, but also a
multiplicity of channels for the flow of information. As an interstate conflict
unfolds and evolves, these channels facilitate the flow of information relevant
to a settlement of the conflict. Whether the signals convey a willingness to
fight or to back down, the importance of societal linkages (or their absence)
increases relative to geopolitical influences, which are still relevant but are
now accompanied by information specific to the ongoing interaction. The Kant-
ian variables do not measure the content of signals sent and received, but they
do indicate the existence of channels through which this information flows.
The concepts of opportunity and willingness contribute to a theoretically more
integrated explanation of militarized disputes. A related view appears in a book
on how scientists explain disease. Thagard (1999) distinguishes between envi-
ronmental inducements of genetic mutation on the one hand and bodily sup-
pressors of harmful mutations on the other. The combination of these two
influences accounts for the progression from simple exposure to the develop-
ment of many diseases in acute form. This insight can be applied to inter-
national relations if we divide the list of influences on the occurrence of military
conflict into two such groups (Russett 2003).
Inducements to conflict include proximity, contiguity, and major power sta-
tus. To these can be added a near-equal power ratio. At least one of them is a
near-necessary condition for a “mutation” or event: a serious diplomatic dis-
pute. Without them, most states have little opportunity or willingness to come
into conflict; but with them, there is a potential for political and diplomatic
conflicts of interest that may under certain conditions escalate into a MID.
Other variables are more usefully considered as potential suppressors. The
weakness of one or more of them allows the process of diplomatic dispute
“mutation” to advance and become a MID. They include joint democracy, high
mutual trade relative to GDP, economies generally open to trade with many
nations, and shared IGO memberships, which include but are not limited to
military alliances.6 Thus “peaceful” dyads may avoid MIDs for different rea-
6 Possibly a very unequal power ratio between the two states could be considered a suppressor of
violent conflict, on the grounds that the weaker state will be deterred from any act that might
provoke the stronger one to violent action. This reasoning can be pushed back to the inducement
stage, in that relatively equal power relations in a realist world of balanced power induces states to
raise diplomatic issues precisely because of the uncertainty about the outcome. (See Wagner 2000
for a rationalist explanation of why war is more probable in closely balanced dyads than in unbal-
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sons: because they are distant and lack other inducements to conflict, or be-
cause they experience enough suppressors to prevent any conflicts from escalating
to violence (Bremer 1992a). MID-prone dyads, by contrast, are similar in shar-
ing both many inducements and few suppressors.
This analogy fits well with the opportunity and willingness perspective on
situational, context-oriented laws that work best for a specific subset of cases
(Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 1995; Goertz 1994).7 In effect, inducements set the
context—the subset of cases where there is an opportunity to fight—and the
absence of suppressors offers a powerful explanation for the emergence of vi-
olent conflicts within this subset.
Data Analysis
This discussion suggests two related improvements to the standard approach
to modeling international conflict: we should consider a wider range of the
conflict spectrum, and in doing so we should take into account the availability
of information at different stages in the conflict process. One way to do this is
to specify models that incorporate selection effects.8
Consider an underlying relationship between serious, potentially violent dy-
adic conflict, y * , and a vector of variables associated with opportunity, X1k,
and another vector associated with willingness, X2l ,
y* 5 X1k b1 1 X2l b2 1 u1.
anced ones, contra Waltz 1979.) Moreover, the power ratio shares with the other inducements the
characteristic of being relatively stable and fixed, only slowly if at all subject to change by delib-
erate policy choice. The suppressor variables, by contrast, all are more clearly subject to political
decision and change. For a historian’s use of the disease inducement and suppressor analogy, see
Schroeder (2000, 208).
7 Goertz (1994) usefully distinguishes between context as “cause” and context as “barrier.” Thus,
the presence of what we refer to as inducements to conflict are causes in this sense, while their
absence can be seen as barriers to conflict. Compared to these contextual factors, what we refer to
as suppressors of conflict are more “active” in dampening the likelihood of conflict.
8 Reed (2000) addresses the issue of selection bias in distinguishing between the causes of mili-
tarized dispute initiation and the causes of dispute escalation, possibly including full-scale war. He
confirms Kugler and Lemke’s (1996) finding that whereas relative power parity between two states
contributes to the onset of militarized disputes, once the states are involved in a dispute, the effect
of power parity switches, with the uncertainty about the outcome of a war diminishing incentives
to escalate. Similarly, Reed finds that though joint democracy may help prevent the onset of a
militarized dispute, it has no significant effect on whether a dispute will escalate simply because
most democratic dyads have been selected out of the sample of MID participants. We have some
reservations about the five-point MID classification as a true scale of escalation. For instance,
about 70% of all events short of war fall into the single category of “use of force,” with few events
classified at the lower levels of “threat of force” and “demonstration of force.” Nevertheless, Reed
is on to a good idea, which we want to pursue further by considering earlier stages of the conflict
process (see also Huth 1996, 2002).
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We observe the onset of a militarized dispute, y m , as a binary outcome,
ym 5 ~y* . 0!,
but this outcome is possible only if some conflict of interest between the two
states comes out into the open as a diplomatic dispute, y s , which is also a
function of opportunity and willingness. That is, underlying dyadic hostility
can only “mutate” into a MID if
ys 5 ~X1k g1 1 X2l g2 1 u2 . 0!.
We expect the estimated coefficients in b1 to have positive signs since the vari-
ables we identify as falling into the category of opportunity represent induce-
ments to conflict. The estimates in b2 should have negative signs because the
willingness variables are conflict suppressors. We might hypothesize the same
for g1 and g2, respectively. However, if the selection effect is such that certain
types of states “substitute” diplomatic or economic hostility for militarized hos-
tility because low-level conflict is seen as an effective way to signal resolve,
then presumed suppressors like joint democracy and economic interdepen-
dence may actually yield coefficients with positive signs. For the reasons dis-
cussed above, we find this alternative hypothesis less persuasive, but the logic
is compelling enough that the proposition should be taken seriously.
The potential for selection bias comes from a correlation between the error
terms u1 and u2. If an unobserved variable like commitment or resolve affects
the likelihood that a dyad will experience some level of conflict, and also the
likelihood that the disputants will be impelled to find a settlement prior to the
militarization of the dispute, then that correlation, r, will be negative. The lit-
erature on costly signals highlights this selection effect and warns of the possi-
bility of erroneous inferences. Fortunately, off-the-shelf procedures are available
for overcoming these problems (Dubin and Rivers 1990). One solution, draw-
ing on Heckman (1979), is to model the selection process using probit (or logit)
and then compute the hazard rate for nonselection. With this hazard rate in-
cluded as a regressor in a separate probit (or logit) model of the outcome, one
can derive consistent estimates. As an alternative to this two-stage estimator, it
is increasingly common to model the selection process and the outcome jointly
using maximum likelihood estimation (with the two-stage estimates serving as
starting values). Both approaches are represented in international relations work
(e.g., Blanton 2000; Huth 1996; Meernik 2000; Reed 2000). We generate the
results below using maximum likelihood.
Events data provide a useful indication of the emergence of low-level con-
flict within a dyad. To model this selection process, we consult three events
databases: the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) (Azar 1993); the World
Event0Interaction Survey (WEIS) (Tomlinson 1993); and the Protocol for the
Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) (Bond and Bond 1998). Each
reports conflictual behavior undertaken by all states in the international sys-
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tem, ranging from mild verbal expressions of discord to full-scale war. Their
temporal coverage differs but they overlap, so among them we can construct a
binary variable, measured annually from 1950 to 1992, indicating the onset of
any dyadic dispute clearing a minimum threshold of conflict, which we opera-
tionalize as strong verbal hostility.9 The experience of such hostile behavior
may prove a more conceptually satisfying way to identify politically relevant
dyads than do the situational criteria of proximity and presence of a major
power.
Findings
Our analysis brings together several important extensions discussed above to
the program of research on “the Kantian Peace” (e.g., Russett and Oneal 2001).
It advances empirical analysis to incorporate insights from formal models of
interstate conflict. The role of information and signaling has been the focus of
much choice-theoretic work in recent years, and the implications for selection
effects, and thus the robustness of previous empirical findings, are beginning
to be realized. We deal with these issues by examining a wider range of con-
flictual behavior so as to model explicitly the selection effects that may have
misled earlier empirical analyses of militarized disputes only. This allows us to
test our hypothesis about the effects of opportunity and willingness being non-
monotonic over different stages of the conflict process.
Before turning to a probit analysis with selection, we present results from
the more common standard probit regression used to model the onset of a mili-
tarized dispute. The data consist of a pooled time-series of all dyads during the
years 1951 to 1992. We use both the variables identified above as defined and
measured in Oneal and Russett (1999b) and the data from that project.10 The
9 This variable is coded 1 for any dyad-year in which at least one of the databases reports a
qualifying event. COPDAB conflict categories are arranged on an ordinal scale. Our minimum
threshold is the category “strong verbal expressions displaying hostility” (e.g., condemnation of
actions or policies, denunciation of leaders, system, or ideology, cancellation of state visits or
summits), which is considered more conflictual than “mild verbal expressions displaying discord”
(e.g., low-key objections to policy or behavior, expressed discontent through a third party) and less
conflictual than “diplomatic-economic hostile actions” (e.g., recall or expulsion of ambassadors,
economic sanctions, troop mobilizations). WEIS and PANDA categories are nominal, but Gold-
stein (1992) developed an interval-scaling system that is now widely used. We count any conflic-
tual event rising to at least the severity level of 2.2 on that scale, which includes the categories
“charge, criticize, blame” and “cancel or postpone planned events.” These types of interaction are
considered more conflictual than, for example, the category “informal complaint” and less conflic-
tual than “formal complaint or protest.” A wide-ranging examination of the uses and limitations of
events data is by Schrodt and Gerner (2000).
10 All independent variables are lagged one year behind the dependent variable. The analysis
incorporates statistical corrections now common in pooled time-series analysis: robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering on dyads, and the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) spline correction for
time-dependence among observations. The spline correction is most commonly used in this litera-
ture to control for time dependence, with the General Estimating Equation (GEE) being another
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opportunity variables are: proximity defined as the (logged) distance in miles
between states, subtracted from zero; a dummy variable coded 1 if they or their
colonies are contiguous by land or within 150 miles by water; a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the dyad includes a major power; and the ratio of the
power of the stronger state to that of the weaker, subtracted from zero. The
willingness variables are: joint democracy measured as the level of democracy
reached by the less democratic state in the dyad; the dyadic trade dependence
of the state with the lower ratio of dyadic trade to GDP; the economic openness
of the state with the lower ratio of total trade to GDP; the number of IGOs in
which the two states share membership; and a dummy variable for whether the
states are allied.
The first two columns of Table 1 show the standard probit estimates for MID
onset, the most common dependent variable in this literature.11 The model in-
cludes all the variables associated with opportunity (inducements) and willing-
ness (suppressors). The first entry for each variable is the estimated coefficient
from the probit regression, and next to that is its standard error. Note first that
the impact of every variable except economic openness is statistically signifi-
cant using a one-tailed test. The results correspond closely with other findings
reported in the literature. Democracy, interdependence, and alliances are strongly
associated with a decline in the probability of a militarized dispute; equal power,
contiguity, proximity, and a major power in the dyad all are associated with
greater probability of a MID. An economy open to trade has the expected neg-
ative sign but is not statistically significant ~ p 5 0.25).
The only counterintuitive result is that sharing more IGO memberships is
associated strongly and positively with dispute initiation, rather than negatively
as hypothesized. This suggests that joint membership in IGOs does not sup-
press militarized disputes, but rather encourages or at least is associated with
them. In part, it results from the methodological choice to use the Beck, Katz,
and Tucker (1998) spline correction for time dependence rather than the Gen-
eral Estimating Equation (GEE). Oneal and Russett (1999a) found their ex-
pected dispute-reducing effect emerged only with GEE, for reasons not yet fully
clear.12 Another possible explanation may lie in limitations of the data. Russett
option. Since both require assumptions that may not be appropriate, neither is fully satisfactory,
and consensus on the best method is lacking (see Alt, King, and Signorino 2001). Likelihood ratio
tests indicate that the spline variables (a count of the years since the last conflict, plus three natural
cubic splines) do capture duration dependence. To reduce clutter, we do not show the spline esti-
mates in the tables.
11 The MID data are the most recent dyadic compilation and refinement by Zeev Maoz (version
1.1), available at ^ftp:00spirit.tau.ac.il0zeevmaoz0dyadmid60.xls&.
12 When we estimate the MID model using GEE—specifying a binomial distribution for MIDs, a
logit link function, and a first-order autoregressive process within dyads—the estimate for IGOs is
negative but not statistically significant. This holds whether we estimate the model from the entire
data set or the subset of dyad years experiencing at least strong verbal hostility.
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and Oneal (2001, chap. 5) discuss the measurement problems resulting from
their simple count of all IGOs without weighting them for importance, func-
tion, institutionalization, or power. Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2001)
identify similar problems and begin to solve them with a theory about institu-
tionalization and the mediating potential of different types of IGOs. When they
recode IGOs using their new criteria, they find that institutionalized IGOs do,
as expected, reduce the frequency of MIDs. Further consideration requires a
clarification of theory, to which we give some attention below.
Of the 209,402 dyad years for which we have complete data, 11,925 consti-
tute the selected sample of minimally conflictual dyad years, and out of these
conflictual dyad years, 745 militarized disputes emerged. Although several dis-
crete conflict events—diplomatic, economic, or military—often comprise a sin-
gle dispute, the events databases do not link them together as such, and we do
not try to distinguish between dispute initiation and continuation when model-
TABLE 1
Probit Estimates for Conflict Opportunity
and Willingness, 1951–1992
Probit Probit with Selection
Militarized Disputes Any Conflict Militarized Disputes
estimate std. error estimate std. error estimate std. error
Willingness
Lower Democracy 20.023 0.005** 20.006 0.002** 20.014 0.004**
Lower Dependence 236.667 10.956** 29.998 2.892** 222.045 8.288**
Lower Economic Openness 20.185 0.161 20.087 0.046** 20.238 0.184*
International Organizations 0.010 0.003** 0.010 0.001** 0.003 0.002
Alliance 20.207 0.079** 0.055 0.026** 20.163 0.063**
Opportunity
Equal Power Ratio 0.048 0.019** 0.055 0.006** 0.008 0.022
Contiguity 1.086 0.087** 0.399 0.044** 0.762 0.094**
Proximity 0.199 0.035** 0.144 0.016** 0.077 0.037**
Major Power 0.849 0.079** 0.955 0.030** 0.018 0.106
Constant 20.896 0.308** 0.057 0.140 20.267 0.312
Wald x2 1291** 568**
N 209,402 209,402 11,925
Note: Estimated r 5 20.176; Wald x2 5 5.88 ~ p 5 0.015) for r 5 0. To correct for duration
dependence, models include a variable representing the number of years since the last conflict
event plus three natural cubic spline variables. For the probit with selection, this correction is
incorporated into both the selection and outcome equations. Standard errors are Huber0White (“ro-
bust”) estimates and also allow for within-dyad dependence.
**significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed)
*significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed)
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ing the selection process. Prolonged conflict represents a continuing context
for the onset of new militarized disputes and the selection process should be
modeled accordingly. In contrast, our interest in MIDs concerns only their ini-
tiation, not their prolongation, although others like Reed (2000) have examined
selection effects at this higher end of the conflict spectrum.
We should also emphasize that when a dyad year is coded 1 for selection
into lower level conflict, it does not necessarily mean that an events database
records strong verbal hostility, but that it records at least strong verbal hostil-
ity. Nevertheless, interstate conflict almost always unfolds in stages; the vast
majority of MIDs are in fact preceded or accompanied by manifestations of
diplomatic conflict. For those MIDs that do not evidence lower level diplo-
matic disputes in the same year, the problem is largely one of incomplete cov-
erage by the media, which are more likely to report on the bigger and more
conflictual—and thus newsworthy—events constituting what is often an evolv-
ing interstate dispute. Such bias is reflected in events databases because they
rely on media reporting as their source of information.13
The remaining columns of Table 1 show estimates from the probit model
with selection. Columns 3 and 4 are estimates of the impact of the opportunity
and willingness variables on the emergence of any conflict within a dyad, in-
cluding diplomatic disputes. All the estimates are statistically significant, which
is not surprising given the very large number of observations. The coefficients
for opportunity (proximity, contiguity, equality of power, and major power sta-
tus) all have the expected signs for conflict inducements. Three of the five
factors we hypothesize to suppress the willingness to engage in militarized con-
flict (joint democracy, interdependence, and economic openness) have that ef-
fect on hostile behavior in general. But two unexpected results emerge for the
other suppressors: IGOs and alliance have the wrong sign for the hypothesis.
While some contributions to the signaling literature would have prepared us for
finding positive coefficient estimates for democracy or interdependence, there
is little in their arguments to suggest that the logic might apply instead to these
other presumed suppressors.
A possible explanation for both unexpected results is suggested by Siverson
and Starr (1991, 93), who, despite placing alliances among the (un)willingness
variables, note that along with borders, “alliances create the salience and0or the
ease of interaction (as predicted by the interaction opportunity model) that sig-
nificantly increases the probability that states will join ongoing wars.” Their
attention is to the likelihood of joining an ongoing war on the side of one’s ally,
13 Of the 745 dyad years with MIDs, 120 had no conflictual event whatever recorded in any of
the three events databases. Events data sets, relying on reports in major news media, tend to under-
report events occurring outside arenas of prominent conflict (e.g., superpower interactions during
the Cold War, the Middle East). Since the undercounting of lower level conflict is almost certainly
the culprit here, as opposed to the overcounting of MIDs, we treat the 120 “missing” conflictual
events as measurement errors and recode these dyad years to 1.
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and in itself does not help.14 But the statement that formal alliances make alli-
ance partners more salient for each other is helpful. Alliances produce not just
bonds of security, but grounds for diplomatic disagreement about institutions,
decision-making procedures, burden-sharing, strategy, and related matters. In
this light, it is less surprising that alliances emerge in the selection process as
inducers of lower level conflict. Similarly, many international organizations (and
our IGO measure includes alliances) may increase the salience of their mem-
bers for each other and raise the possibility of diplomatic and political disputes
that will catch the headlines. Moreover, many IGOs are regional and reflect the
salience that neighbors already have for each other and often are created to
deal with existing disputes. Since IGOs share some variance with the geograph-
ical measures (proximity and contiguity), they may not necessarily induce dis-
putes, but they may still be correlated noncausally with them.15 Thus Boehmer,
Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2001) find that while well institutionalized IGOs are
effective in reducing MIDs, measures of preexisting contention among IGO
members are associated with a higher incidence of MIDs.
This part of the analysis also raises doubt about some strategic-choice sig-
naling explanations of conflict. One hypothesis, discussed above, holds that
democratic institutions or economic interdependence provide means for states
to convey their resolve by their actions in diplomatic disputes and that these
signals of resolve therefore make it less necessary to escalate the merely diplo-
matic disputes to militarized ones. This implies that whereas democracy and
interdependence will have a negative impact on the probability of MIDs, they
not only will have less impact on lower level diplomatic or economic disputes
but may even contribute to the frequency of such disputes. But our results do
not confirm the latter expectation. Democracy and interdependence do not en-
courage lower level conflict as an instrument of signaling but, rather, help pre-
vent those disputes as well. Something other than signaling in this sense may
be operating, as suggested by theories emphasizing the wider communication
of information conducive to bargaining, other aspects of democratic and eco-
nomic institutions that promote compromise, or the strengthening of common
identities (Russett and Oneal 2001, chap. 2).
Now turn to the last two columns of Table 1, which focus on the sample of
conflictual dyad years and the onset of militarized disputes. The effect of the
power ratio is not significant at all here, confirming Reed’s (2000) argument
14 Of the 23 post-World War II warring dyads that were not politically relevant by Lemke and
Reed’s (2001a) criteria, all but one involve states that joined an ongoing war they did not originate.
Of the 22 “irrelevant” joiners, 19 are from widely expanded multi-actor wars: the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, and the Gulf War against Iraq. Overwhelmingly, then, joiners are small states oper-
ating under the umbrella of major powers who bring them in and frequently provide much of the
logistics, equipment, and command and control to make the war-fighting coalition succeed. We
tried omitting joiners, but the results were essentially unchanged.
15 In our data the correlation between shared IGO membership and proximity together with the
binary indicator of contiguity is 0.42.
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about the nonmonotonic effects of power parity at different levels of conflict,
but calling into question his particular finding that parity is associated with
MID onset. Whereas a more equal power ratio provides an opportunity for lower
level conflict, it would be wrong to conclude that making the ratio more un-
equal will help in suppressing the escalation to a militarized dispute.16 Major
power status also exerts no significant impact on MID onset once we account
for selection. Most of the other variables (democracy, dependence, alliance,
proximity, and contiguity) have significant effects of the type we predict. The
impact of being allied, while associated with salience and the potential for
lesser forms of conflict, clearly suppresses the emergence of militarized dis-
putes. The effect of an open economy is also in the direction predicted but is
only weakly significant ( p 5 0.10). The unanticipated positive effect of IGOs
in the selection process no longer holds when it comes to MID onset; the coef-
ficient is still positive, but its standard error is large and does not support an
inference one way or the other.
This analysis does reveal a selection effect, as indicated by the estimate of
r, but it is modest (20.18) though statistically significant ~x2 5 5.9, p 5
0.015). Factors not explicitly included in our model have one effect on dyadic
involvement in lower level conflict but a somewhat opposite effect on the
onset of militarized disputes. Commitment or resolve is an example of such a
factor, difficult to measure and therefore consigned to the error term. As Fearon
(1994b) and others have pointed out, states may be more likely to become
involved in disputes when they are resolved to secure their interests by force
if necessary and confident about ultimately prevailing. Knowing this, their
opponents are more inclined to back down before the dispute escalates to
violence. We believe that democratic institutions and practices of governance
facilitate the sending of credible signals, but the modest selection effect re-
vealed here does not constitute evidence that they are more likely to become
involved in lower level conflict for this reason. Joint democracy and interdepen-
dence are explicitly represented in the model and evidence suppressing effects
on militarized and nonmilitarized disputes. Some states may substitute diplo-
matic or economic conflict for militarized conflict, but neither democratic nor
interdependent states show a particular tendency to do it when interacting
with each other.
To compare the effects of opportunity and willingness and to compare their
impact at different stages of the conflict process, we should focus not on the
coefficients or significance levels, but on the percentage change in the proba-
bility of conflict. Table 2 shows these estimates. We compute the baseline prob-
ability of conflictual behavior, and the probability of MID onset conditional on
such behavior, for contiguous dyads in which the opportunity and willingness
16 Lemke and Reed (2001b) report that while power parity increases the probability that great
powers will become rivals, it reduces the likelihood of war once they have become rivals.
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variables are at their mean or median levels.17 The change in probability re-
ported for each variable is the percentage difference between this baseline and
the probability of conflict when that variable alone is increased to the value
corresponding to the 90th percentile in our data. Thus, for the dichotomous
measures of alliance and major power, the computed effect is for a dyad that is
allied and a dyad in which one or both states is a major power.
The results are very informative. Joint democracy, interdependence, and eco-
nomic openness each are more important in reducing the risk of militarized
disputes than they are in reducing the risk of conflict generally (though they do
that, too). When it comes to serious conflict, the magnitude of the risk reduc-
tion coming from being allied is greater than the increased risk of low-level
conflict due to salience. While these conflict suppressors become more impor-
tant in reducing the willingness of states to risk more violent conflict, the re-
17 The median is used for dependence, which is highly skewed. Dyads are taken to be nonallied
and not including a major power. We compute baseline probabilities for contiguous dyads, even
though most are not contiguous, because the likelihood that noncontiguous dyad-years will expe-
rience a MID onset is so very low: 0.1% in our sample. Even for noncontiguous dyads experienc-
ing conflict in a given year, only 2.5% experience a MID. Therefore, the impact of inducements
and suppressors on militarized disputes is more relevant for contiguous dyads, though the model is
estimated from data for both types. The percentage of contiguous dyad years in our sample with a
MID onset is 7.0; for dyad-years in conflict, 23.0.
TABLE 2
Estimated Change in Risk Probabilities for Conflict Opportunity
and Willingness, 1951–1992
%DPr(conflict51) %DPr(MID51|conflict51)
Willingness
Lower Democracy 212.5 231.7
Lower Dependence 21.5 23.8
Lower Economic Openness 24.0 212.1
International Organizations 127.5 [112.1]
Alliance 110.1 226.1
Opportunity
Equal Power Ratio 117.2 [15.3]
Proximity 130.9 122.1
Major Power 1271.7 [131.5]
Baseline 0.100 0.079
Note: Baseline probability levels are computed for contiguous, nonallied, nonmajor-power dy-
ads, with lower democracy and lower dependence set at their sample medians and all other vari-
ables set at their means. Figures are for a change in a single independent variable from its mean0
median level to the 90th percentile. Brackets indicate that the coefficient estimate for that variable
was not statistically significant (see Table 1).
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verse holds for inducements. This is not surprising in the case of dyads that
are geographically proximate and dyads involving at least one major power
since they are strongly associated with increased interaction—opportunity—
and therefore experience a greater likelihood that disagreements, large and
small, will arise over a host of issues. Once we account for dyadic interaction
turning conflictual, even at a low level, the additional inducement for more
serious conflict provided by proximity and major power status becomes less
pronounced.
These patterns strongly support our conceptualization of opportunity and
willingness as they relate to the flow of information in an ongoing and poten-
tially hostile interaction. If conflict usually unfolds in stages, then the oppor-
tunities to engage in hostile behavior should be apparent relatively early in the
conflict process (though not necessarily absent later). Save for near-equal power,
the inducements we identify are straightforward measures of opportunity. Even
a near-equal power ratio, which is accompanied by none of the certainties of
power imbalance, opens up opportunities to probe for the possibility of gain-
ing relative to an opponent, other things being equal. Power transition theory
says that parity is an inducement to war, but our results suggest that parity is
first and foremost an inducement to emerging conflicts of interest. Militarized
conflict may follow, but by then the effects of near-equal power have already
come to light.
The presence of conflict suppressors, on the other hand, does not imply a
perfect harmony of interests according to most contemporary liberal theories
about war and peace. Instead, these arguments point to an unwillingness among
democratic and interdependent states to engage each other in more serious forms
of conflict, in part due to domestic political and economic costs involved. Con-
flict happens, as these are often highly interactive dyads. Suppressors help to
restrain conflict at all levels, but their impact on states’ unwillingness to esca-
late to higher levels of hostility is more apparent later in the process after
more information has been exchanged in what is essentially an ongoing bar-
gaining interaction.
Instead of considering each influence individually as additive, it might be
instructive to consider an alternative specification. Different factors are often
substitutable in the sense that one (or a few) may be sufficient to provide the
opportunity for interaction, and similarly for the class of factors we associate
with willingness. But it is the conjunction of opportunity and willingness that
constitutes causal necessity. This conceptualization implies there are multiple
paths to an outcome represented by different combinations of opportunity and
willingness variables (Braumoeller 2001a; Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 1995). Each
type of influence constitutes an additive vector of important factors, but in
contrast to the model we estimate above, a militarized dispute results from the
interaction of these two vectors such that
Pr~ y 6b, X ! 5 F~X1k b1! 3 F~X2l b2 !,
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where F denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. That is,
MIDs arise from two jointly necessary conditions: some combination of factors
leading to opportunity conjoined with some combination of factors driving will-
ingness. A similar conceptualization might be applied to conflict more gener-
ally, including lower level diplomatic and economic disputes. The idea of
substitutability and multiple paths to war implies that the individual elements
of opportunity and willingness are switched on and off in various ways for
different dyads, and these different combinations place states at varying de-
grees of risk for violent confrontation. This empirical model, however, simply
states that the extent to which each inducement is present contributes to the
opportunity for conflict, that the extent to which each of the suppressors is
absent contributes to willingness, and that it is the interaction of these two
vectors that affects the probability of actual conflict.
We do not necessarily prefer such a specification over a purely additive one,
but it is worthwhile considering it as a robustness check on the results above.18
Following Braumoeller (2001b), we estimated an “aggregated probit” model
for MIDs as well as dyadic conflict generally. All of the estimates are statisti-
cally significant. Each has the same sign as before, and the rank order of im-
portance among the variables in each vector, as indicated by percentage changes
in risk, is nearly identical to those in Table 2. The pattern evident there—the
opportunity variables are more important at lower levels of the conflict process
than when the dispute becomes militarized, while the reverse holds for the
willingness variables—is almost perfectly replicated.
Conclusion
This article indicates the importance of further research on escalation and
bargaining along the entire spectrum of conflict behavior, from mere diplo-
matic disputes to full-scale war. Overall, our findings correspond with Kant’s
understanding that all states are subject to the realist conditions of interstate
competition that makes disputes likely but that the liberal influences, where
present, can constrain the escalation of such disputes to war (Doyle 1997, chap.
8). Our analysis has also yielded some new and noteworthy results. First, joint
IGO memberships and alliances may reflect and even promote interactions and
conflicts of interest that could give rise to diplomatic disputes, but IGOs do not
contribute to the escalation of lower level conflicts to militarized disputes, and
alliances significantly reduce the escalation of disputes between their mem-
bers. Second, while power parity and major power status also may promote the
emergence of diplomatic disputes, they do not increase the probability that dip-
lomatic conflicts will escalate to MIDs, once we account for selection effects.
Third, the proposition that democracy and interdependence encourage diplo-
matic conflicts as signals of resolve is not supported. Joint democracy and
18 These results are available from the first author on request.
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interdependence strongly reduce the risk that lower level conflicts will escalate
to MIDs, and they also help prevent lower level conflict from emerging in the
first place.
We have sought to incorporate some insights from the strategic choice liter-
ature into our statistical analysis, especially concerning the role of information
and the communication of resolve. The potential for biased inferences in em-
pirical work suggests the appropriateness of techniques that explicitly model
the selection process. We employ one such method here and although our re-
sults reveal the existence of selection effects, these are fairly modest. Perhaps
more important, taking seriously the possibility of selection effects in the con-
text of a two-stage conceptualization of the conflict process leads us to think
further about the role of information within the opportunity0willingness frame-
work. We argue that the geopolitical factors affecting the opportunity for con-
flict, which are also the factors highlighted in realist theories, should be more
important in earlier stages of the conflict process, when less information is
available regarding acceptable settlements and the resolve of actors to achieve
them, than in later stages. By contrast, the importance of factors affecting
willingness—democratic norms and institutions and economic interdepen-
dence, as emphasized by liberal theories—should increase as the conflict pro-
cess unfolds because they facilitate the flow of information relevant to the ongoing
dispute. Our empirical analysis supports this argument. The microfoundations
of this proposition seem to us worthy of further exploration within a choice-
theoretic framework.
This investigation provides confirmation for our suspicion that the effects of
various influences on the conflict process are nonmonotonic over the range of
hostile behavior that states engage in, from diplomatic disputes to all-out war.
The method we use, a maximum likelihood probit procedure incorporating the
selection process, better fits our conceptualization than do traditional proce-
dures. However, more methodological work remains to develop statistical tech-
niques that more closely correspond to the strategic choice framework, which
has given rise to many of the insights and propositions that empirical research-
ers have been examining.
A major advance in this regard is Signorino’s (1999) modification of probit
and logit analysis. He connects statistical estimation to the decision nodes and
possible outcomes of a sequential interaction between states (e.g., a military
crisis) in a way we find compelling. However, his method requires that an ob-
served event be identifiable as one among the possible outcomes of a strategic
interaction. The unit of analysis must be the sequential interaction, and one
with a reasonably consistent strategic structure comprising certain moves and
countermoves. MIDs, as documented and coded by the Correlates of War Project,
seem to fit the bill reasonably well, but the dyad-year version of the MIDs
data, which we use, does not. In the case of the events databases (COPDAB,
WEIS, and PANDA), even the raw, disaggregated data are not suitable since
individual events are not cross-referenced to other events that may together
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comprise a single strategic interaction. We hope further progress can be made
both in events data collection and in adapting methods like Signorino’s to the
pooled time-series context.
Finally, the distinction between opportunity and willingness can be produc-
tively applied to theories and their policy implications for contemporary inter-
national relations. In relations between regional rivals or major powers—as in
the Middle East, or between China and the United States—there will be oppor-
tunities for conflicts of interest to erupt into diplomatic or other nonmilitarized
disputes, a potential likely to be aggravated by relative equality of power. It is
all the more important, then, that factors suppressing the willingness to esca-
late conflict be strong and numerous, and for theorists and policy makers to
promote those that may be available and effective. Of those underscored by
liberal theory, dyadic economic ties and general openness to the global econ-
omy may not have such strong effects as joint democracy, but they are much
more subject to policy initiative and choice.
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